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NOTE
A Narrow Escape: Transcending the GID
Exclusion in the Americans with Disabilities
Act
Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa.
May 18, 2017)

Taylor Payne*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was implemented in
1990 and is hailed as a pivotal piece of legislation that protects the civil rights
of individuals with disabilities.1 Driven by the prejudice of certain influential
legislators, transgender individuals were purposefully excluded from the
ADA’s protection.2 This exclusion – commonly referred to as the “GID Exclusion” – ensured that “transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairments” were not considered a “disability” under the ADA.3 The GID Exclusion effectively produced a categorical bar for
transgender plaintiffs seeking legal recourse under the ADA despite the fact
that many transgender individuals experience clinically significant stress
known as Gender Dysphoria, a recognized and serious medical condition that
can substantially limit major life activities.4
*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate 2019, University of Missouri
School of Law; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019. I am grateful to
Professor Anne Alexander and the entire Missouri Law Review staff for their guidance and encouragement in writing this Note.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213
(1990).
2. See 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statements of Sen.
Harkin), Cong. Rec S 10765-01, at 1989 WL 183216.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012) (“Disability shall not include . . . transsexualism [or] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.”).
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(finding an employer’s requirement that transgender employee use men’s restroom
did not violate the ADA because “transsexualism is excluded from the definition of
disability no matter how it is characterized, whether as a physical impairment, a mental disorder, or some combination thereof”), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004);
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS Gender Dysphoria § 302.6, at 455 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]
(listing clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning as consequence of Gender Dysphoria).
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For almost two decades following the passage of the ADA, the GID Exclusion was left virtually unchallenged. Moreover, transgender plaintiffs who
tried to invoke the ADA’s protections were unsuccessful – that is until 2014,
when Kate Lynn Blatt (“Blatt”) brought suit in federal court.5 Blatt, a
transgender woman with Gender Dysphoria,6 alleged she was either covered
under the ADA or the ADA’s exclusions were unconstitutional.7 Blatt’s suit
marks one of the few times the GID Exclusion has been challenged and the
only time in which a court has held the ADA does not categorically bar
transgender plaintiffs from protection.8
This Note discusses the groundbreaking ruling of Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. and its potential impact on transgender individuals in the public and
legal spheres. Part II of this Note provides the pertinent facts and holding
from Blatt. Part III discusses the history of the ADA and the impetus for the
GID Exclusion. Part III then turns to the current legal landscape for
transgender individuals at the national and state level. Part IV details the
instant decision and explores the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania’s legal reasoning and holding. Part V addresses arguments
for and against the holding of the instant decision, detailing positions argued
by the United States of America and amici curiae in the case.
Ultimately, Part V argues that Blatt should be recognized as a momentous decision. Not all transgender individuals have Gender Dysphoria9 and
therefore they may not always be able to invoke the protections found in the
ADA on that basis.10 However, for transgender individuals who do experience Gender Dysphoria, Blatt provides hope that decades-old prejudice enshrined in federal legislation can be overcome through reasonable statutory
5. See Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
6. Individuals are diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria when they experience
clinically significant stress that results from “[a] marked incongruence between experienced/expressed gender and [gender assigned at birth].” See DSM-V, supra note 4,
§ 302.6, at 455.
7. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2.
8. Id. at *4; see also Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1001–02; Rentos v. OceOffice Sys., No. 95 CIV. 7908 LAP, 1996 WL 737215, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24,
1996).
9. See Brief of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Mazzoni
Center, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Center for Transgender Equality, National LGBTQ Task Force, and Transgender Law Center in Opposition to Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss at 3, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123 (No. 5:14-cv04822) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae] (noting that many transgender individuals
do not experience stress related to their transgender status; “they are completely comfortable living just the way they are [without medical or other intervention].”).
10. The specifics of a particular case would determine whether a transgender
individual without Gender Dysphoria would be covered under the ADA. Theoretically, even a transgender individual without Gender Dysphoria might enjoy ADA protection, provided they were discriminated against because they were “regarded as” having Gender Dysphoria. See text accompanying infra note 51.
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interpretation, resulting in much needed legal protections for a community
that still faces “severe and pervasive discrimination in nearly every aspect [of
life].”11

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2014, Blatt filed suit against her former employer, Cabela’s Retail,
Inc. (“Cabela’s”), for impermissible sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and impermissible discrimination on the basis of disability under the ADA.12 Blatt sought an award of
damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, attorney’s fees, and other relief.13
In response, Cabela’s filed a motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claim.14 Ultimately, Cabela’s motion to dismiss was denied.15
Cabela’s is a retail business that specializes in outdoor equipment and
clothing.16 In September 2006, Cabela’s hired Blatt as a seasonal stocker.17
One year before she was hired, Blatt was diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria,18
sometimes referred to as Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”).19 Blatt was assigned male at birth, but she identifies as female.20 Blatt engaged in hormone
therapy, grew her hair long, dressed in female attire, and changed her name in
order to conform to her female gender.21
As part of her employment at Cabela’s, Blatt was required to attend an
employee orientation at which she dressed in women’s clothing and used the
women’s restroom without any problem.22 Following orientation, Blatt requested a female uniform23 and began wearing one when she did not receive a

11. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 1.
12. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *1.
13. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 1, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123

(No. 5:14-cv-04822).
14. See Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *1.
15. Id.
16. Our History, CABELA’S: WORLD’S FOREMOST OUTFITTER,
https://www.cabelas.com/content.jsp?pageName=history (last visited June 25, 2018);
see First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 14 (“Blatt was
excited to begin her employment with the Defendant, as she is an active participant in
outdoor sports, and highly knowledgeable about the same.”).
17. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶¶ 12–13.
18. Id. ¶ 10; see supra text accompanying note 6.
19. “Gender Identity Disorder” was removed from DSM-V and replaced with
“Gender Dysphoria”; the two have different diagnostic criteria. See discussion infra
Section III.A.
20. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 9.
21. Id. ¶ 11.
22. Id. ¶ 15.
23. These requests were made as requests for reasonable accommodations. Id. ¶
16.
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response to her request.24 Blatt also requested a nametag that read “Kate
Lynn” as a reasonable accommodation for her Gender Dysphoria, but
Cabela’s Human Resources Director denied her request.25 Blatt’s complaint
alleged that, in retaliation for requesting the female nametag, the Human Resources Director forced her to wear a nametag that read “James.”26 Additionally, the Human Resources Director commanded all other employees to refer
to Blatt as “James” or they would be fired.27 Blatt also alleged that the Human Resources Director told her she could receive a nametag reading “Kate
Lynn” only after she legally changed her name and gender marker.28 The
Human Resources Director also prohibited Blatt from continuing to use the
women’s restroom until her gender marker was legally changed.29 Moreover,
Blatt was often secluded and forced to work alone, unlike other nontransgender employees who often worked in teams.30
Approximately one month after she was hired, Blatt was called in for an
abrupt meeting with one of Cabela’s shift supervisors who accused Blatt of
“failing to pull her weight” and suggested she consider quitting.31 Following
this meeting, Blatt was subjected to numerous derogatory and offensive
comments by fellow employees, including being called “‘he/she,’ ‘ladyboy,’
‘fag,’ ‘sinner,’ and ‘freak.’”32 Employees also asked offensive questions
about Blatt’s body.33 Blatt reported the discrimination against her to a different Cabela’s supervisor (“Supervisor Bowers”), who reported the discrimination to Cabela’s upper management, including the Human Resources Director.34 However, neither upper management nor the Human Resources Director attempted to investigate the matter or take steps to prevent further discrimination.35

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
Id. ¶ 18. “James” was the name given to Blatt when she was born. Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id. A gender marker is the designation on an official identity document or
other identity form that lists one’s gender. Am. Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for
Psychological Practice with Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 70
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 832, 862 (2015),
https://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdf [hereinafter APA Guidelines]. Transgender individuals often encounter administrative and legal barriers that
hinder them from accurately reflecting their gender identity on driver’s licenses, passports, etc. Robyn B. Gigl, Transgender: Understanding Who the “T” in “LGBT” Are
and Their Unique Legal Issues, N.J. LAW., June 2013, at 10, 17.
29. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 19.
30. Id. ¶ 23.
31. Id. ¶ 20.
32. Id. ¶ 21.
33. Id.
34. Id. ¶ 22.
35. Id.
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Blatt applied for a promotion approximately two months after she was
hired and at various points thereafter in the course of her employment.36 A
Cabela’s supervisor told Blatt that the corporate office had specifically ordered him not to promote Blatt even though he thought Blatt was “wellqualified” for the promotion.37 After applying for one promotion, Blatt overheard a maintenance manager tell Supervisor Bowers that Blatt was a “confused sicko” and that he would not interview Blatt “under any circumstances.”38
Even after Blatt legally changed her name and gender marker, Cabela’s
Human Resources Director refused to allow her access to the women’s restroom,39 citing the unfounded belief that Blatt would pose a danger to other
women.40 Supervisor Bowers told Blatt that the staff wished her to use a
gender-neutral restroom at a Dunkin’ Donuts across the street.41 When Blatt
refused, Cabela’s reluctantly allowed her to use a family unisex restroom at
the front of the store, which was still significantly farther away than the employee restrooms.42 After Blatt legally changed her name, Cabela’s issued
her three incorrect nametags43 before finally providing her with a nametag
that correctly stated her name.44
According to Blatt’s complaint, in February 2007, Blatt “amicably approached” a maintenance technician and asked about her cleaning schedule.45
In response, the technician yelled at Blatt and blamed her for disrupting the
schedule.46 Blatt was subsequently fired for allegedly threatening the technician’s son during the altercation.47 Blatt did not know the technician had a
son and denied making any such threats.48 Blatt claimed Cabela’s articulated
reason for terminating her “was[ ] pretextual and her employment was actual36. Compare id. ¶ 25 (applying for a promotion around “November of 2006 and
continuing throughout the course of her employment”), with id. ¶ 12 (starting work in
September 2006). Blatt’s complaint alleges she had excellent job performance. Id. ¶
25.
37. Id.
38. Id. ¶ 26.
39. Blatt was under the impression she would be able to use the women’s restroom after she legally changed her name and gender marker. See id. ¶ 28.
40. Id. ¶ 29.
41. Id. ¶ 30. As Blatt was denied use of the female restroom as a reasonable
accommodation, she requested a gender-neutral restroom as a reasonable accommodation. See id. ¶¶ 29–30.
42. Id. ¶ 31.
43. Blatt’s complaint stated that she thought an incorrect nametag was provided
to her on three separate occasions intentionally in an effort to degrade her. Id. ¶ 32.
44. Id.
45. Id. ¶ 33.
46. Id.
47. Id. ¶ 34. The technician “was neither terminated nor disciplined for her involvement in said altercation.” Id. ¶ 35.
48. Id. ¶ 34.
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ly terminated based on her sex, her actual and/or perceived disability and/or
record of impairment, and in retaliation for opposing unlawful discrimination
in the workplace and requesting a reasonable accommodation for her disability.”49 After she was fired, Blatt filed suit against Cabela’s alleging unlawful
discrimination in violation of Title VII and the ADA.50
“The ADA makes it unlawful for a covered employer to discriminate
against any ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability.’”51 To bring suit
under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [they52 are] disabled within
the meaning of the ADA,53 (2) [they are] a qualified individual under the
ADA, 54 and (3) [they] suffered an adverse employment action because of
[their] disability.”55 “Disability” under the ADA includes “physical or mental
impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activities.”56 Blatt
asserted her Gender Dysphoria substantially limited one or more of her major
49. Id. ¶ 36.
50. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2

(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
51. EEOC v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012)).
52. Throughout this Note, singular “they” is used in order to respect and
acknowledge nonbinary individuals; the author believes that “they” should be the
default singular pronoun for an individual of unknown gender, rather than utilizing
“he or she.” See Singular ‘They’, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/words-at-play/singular-nonbinary-they (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
53. “Disability” under the ADA is a broad concept; a person is covered under the
ADA if they are discriminated against based on (1) a real disability, (2) a perceived
disability or (2) a record of such impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012). An individual is also covered by the ADA if the person has – currently or in the past – a medical condition that, without treatment, would be substantially limiting. See id. §
12102(4)(E)(i) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures.”).
54. “The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
55. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d at 969 (quoting Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d
1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013)); Young v. Warner–Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021
(8th Cir. 1998)).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,
lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working . . . . [A] major life activity also includes
the operation of major bodily functions, including but not limited to, functions
of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.

Id. § 12102(2)(A)–(B).
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life activities including, but not limited to, reproducing, social and occupational functioning, and interacting with others.57 Thus, Blatt alleged her
Gender Dysphoria met the criteria of a disability and entitled her to protection
under the ADA.58
Cabela’s filed a motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claim, asserting that
Blatt failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.59 Cabela’s
argued the explicit text of the ADA – in particular § 12211, which excludes
from the definition of disability “gender identity disorders not resulting from
physical impairments”60 – applied to Blatt’s Gender Dysphoria and precluded
her from bringing a viable ADA claim.61 Blatt argued her condition was covered under the ADA or, in the alternative, that if her condition was excluded
from the scope of the ADA’s coverage, then the GID Exclusion violated her
right to equal protection as guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.62
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Judge
Joseph F. Leeson Jr. presiding, narrowly construed the text of the ADA’s
GID Exclusion and held that Blatt’s Gender Dysphoria is a covered disability
under the ADA.63 Judge Leeson construed the ADA’s language narrowly to
avoid ruling on the constitutionality of the GID Exclusion.64
The ADA’s GID Exclusion provides that “gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairment” are not disabilities under the ADA.65
Judge Leeson held that the term “gender identity disorders” referred “only
[to] the [state] of identifying with a . . . gender [other than the one to which
an individual is assigned at birth].”66 Judge Leeson further held that clinically disabling conditions, like Blatt’s Gender Dysphoria, “go[] beyond” simply
identifying with a gender other than the one assigned.67 Thus, disabling conditions like Blatt’s Gender Dysphoria are not included in the narrowly con57. First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 10.
58. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2

(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
59. Id. at *1.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012).
61. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *3–4.
64. Id. at *2–3 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States
v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957)) (“The constitutional-avoidance canon prescribes that ‘[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that [the
court] will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.’ . . . . Thus, if there is a ‘fairly possible’ interpretation of § 12211 that permits the Court to avoid the constitutional question Blatt has
raised, the Court must adopt that interpretation.”).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12211.
66. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2.
67. Id.
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strued term “gender identity disorders” and therefore are not barred from
coverage as a disability under the ADA.68
As Part IV of this Note will further explore, Judge Leeson arrived at this
conclusion by invoking the constitutional-avoidance canon and further by
looking to the text of the ADA’s GID Exclusion and attempting to render it
internally consistent.69 Because Judge Leeson found that Blatt did experience
clinically significant stress (as reflected in her official Gender Dysphoria
diagnosis), he held that the ADA did not exclude her from its protection. 70
Cabela’s motion to dismiss Blatt’s ADA claim was denied.71
Of particular note in the instant case are the statements of interest submitted by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).72 In its first Statement of
Interest, the DOJ asked the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to avoid ruling
on the constitutionality of the ADA’s GID Exclusion and instead asked the
court to resolve Blatt’s claim under Title VII alone.73 The DOJ dodged opining about the constitutionality of the GID Exclusion and did not provide any
analysis of Blatt’s ADA claim.74 Subsequently, the DOJ was specifically
ordered by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to address the ADA claim in
a second statement of interest.75 The DOJ’s Second Statement of Interest and
the arguments of amici curiae – various lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (“LGBT”) advocacy organizations – are further discussed in Part
V of this Note.76

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section A first addresses terms and definitions related to gender. Section B then briefly details the ADA, including when and to whom it applies,
its mandates, and what plaintiffs must show in order to support a viable cause
of action under its provisions. Section C explains that transgender plaintiffs
have not often sought protection under the ADA and further explains that
protection for transgender plaintiffs has been denied in the limited instances
68. Id. at *4. In other words, Judge Leeson differentiated between a plaintiff
whose internal sense of gender differs from their gender assigned at birth (i.e., someone who is transgender) and a person who experiences clinically significant stress
related to their gender identity (i.e., someone with Gender Dysphoria). See id. at *3–
4.
69. See id. at *2–3.
70. Id. at *4.
71. Id. at *5.
72. Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt, 2017 WL
2178123 (No. 5:14-cv-04822) [hereinafter First Statement of Interest]; Second Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123 (No. 5:14cv-04822) [hereinafter Second Statement of Interest].
73. First Statement of Interest, supra note 72.
74. See id.
75. See Second Statement of Interest, supra note 72.
76. See infra Section V.C.
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in which ADA suits have been filed. Section D then explores current legal
protections utilized by transgender plaintiffs who experience discrimination
and discusses how those protections have developed over time. Sections E
and F conclude this Part by exploring recent legal developments with respect
to the rights of transgender individuals.

A. Understanding Terms and Definitions Related to Gender
As our understanding of gender evolves, so, too, does the language we
use to conceptualize it. There are various terms in modern vernacular that
were not widely known or used in previous decades, and this Section describes a few such terms pertinent to the instant case.
“Gender identity” refers to someone’s deeply felt, inherent sense of being a man, woman, or other gender (e.g., non-binary, genderqueer, etc.).77
“Transgender” is an umbrella term used to describe someone whose internal
sense of gender differs from the gender they were assigned at birth.78 In this
Note, “gender assigned at birth” is used rather than “sex assigned at birth.”
This Note uses “gender” rather than “sex” in this context because when the
term “sex assigned at birth” is used, gender assigned at birth is typically what
is being conveyed and intended – a person’s sex is more difficult to determine
than commonly understood.79 Moreover, the definition and understanding of
77. GLAAD
Media
Reference
Guide
–
Transgender,
https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender [hereinafter GLAAD Guide].

GLAAD,

Non-binary and/or genderqueer [are t]erms used by some people who experience their gender identity and/or gender expression as falling outside the categories of man and woman. They may define their gender as falling somewhere in between man and woman, or they may define it as wholly different
from
these
terms.
The
term
is
not
a
synonym
for transgender or transsexual and should only be used if someone selfidentifies as non-binary and/or genderqueer . . . . Gender nonconforming [is] a
term used to describe some people whose gender expression is different from
conventional expectations of masculinity and femininity. Please note that not
all gender non-conforming people identify as transgender; nor are all
transgender people gender non-conforming. Many people have gender expressions that are not entirely conventional – that fact alone does not make
them transgender. Many transgender men and women have gender expressions that are conventionally masculine or feminine.
Simply being
transgender does not make someone gender non-conforming. The term is not
a synonym for transgender or transsexual and should only be used if someone
self-identifies as gender non-conforming.

Id. (emphasis omitted).
78. APA Guidelines, supra note 28, at 832; see also GLAAD Guide, supra note
77.
79. See
Gender
and
Genetics,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.who.int/genomics/gender/en/index1.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2018)
(“[T]here is a range of chromosome complements, hormone balances, and phenotypic

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 10

808

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

“sex” is influenced by social and cultural norms as much as the understanding
of “gender.”80
GID is an outdated diagnostic term the medical community formerly
used to diagnose and treat transgender individuals.81 The term is found in the
ADA’s exclusions – hence the shorthand “GID Exclusion” – because the
drafters of the GID Exclusion extrapolated their exclusionary language from
the preeminent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third
Edition Revised (“DSM-III-R”), which was authoritative circa 1990.82 GID
appeared in two editions (including their respective revised editions) of the
variations that determine sex.”). WHO details how certain conditions, such as Klinefelter syndrome, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), and Androgen Insensitivity
Syndrome (AIS) can affect the appearance of secondary sex characteristics – which
are commonly used to determine the “sex” of an infant. See id. For instance, “Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) is an X-linked recessive disorder in which affected individuals have external female genitalia and breast development despite
being [designated as] genetically male (46XY).” Id.
80. See PENELOPE ECKHERT & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, LANGUAGE AND
GENDER 1–2 (2013).
[W]hile we think of sex as biological and gender as social, this distinction is
not clear-cut. People tend to think of gender as the result of nurture – as social
and hence fluid – while sex is the result of nature, simply given by biology.
However, nature and nurture intertwine, and there is no obvious point at
which sex leaves off and gender begins.

Id. at 2.
A sharp demarcation between sex and gender ultimately fails because
there
is no single objective biological criterion for [sex. The determination of an individual’s s]ex is based [on] a combination of anatomical, endocrinal, and
chromosomal features, and the selection among these criteria for sex assignment is based very much on cultural beliefs about what actually makes someone male or female. Thus the very definition of the biological categories male
and female, and people’s understanding of themselves and others as male or
female, is ultimately social . . . . “[L]abeling someone a man or a woman is a
social decision. We may use scientific knowledge to help us make the decision, but only our beliefs about gender – not science – can define our sex. Furthermore, our beliefs about gender affect what kinds of knowledge scientists
produce about sex in the first place.”

Id. (quoting ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY (2000)).
81. See e.g., Gender Identity Disorders: Transsexualism, Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood, and Atypical Gender Identity Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed., rev. 1987);
Gender Identity Disorder, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed., 1994).
82. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 12. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12211
(2012).
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Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as a recognized medical condition.83 Many advocates of the transgender community took issue
with GID as the name of the medical condition; advocates felt this name endorsed the notion that being transgender was a deviant mental disorder.84
In the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (“DSM-V”), published in 2013, the American Psychiatric Association
(“APA”) removed GID, replaced it with “Gender Dysphoria,” and revised the
underlying diagnostic criteria.85 Gender Dysphoria refers to the clinically
significant stress that accompanies the “marked incongruence” between one’s
internal sense of gender and their gender assigned at birth.86 Not every
transgender person has Gender Dysphoria – some transgender individuals do
not experience clinically significant stress related to their gender identity.87
Often, those who do not experience clinically significant stress do not seek
medical intervention, such as hormone therapy or surgery.88
In addition to “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairment,” the ADA’s GID Exclusion prohibits coverage for “transsexualism.”89 “Transsexual” is an older term, though some individuals still prefer

83. See e.g., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
MENTAL DISORDERS Gender Identity Disorders §§ 302.5, 302.60, 302.82, at 261–
66 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. GID was listed in different forms in DSM-IV
and DSM-III. See, e.g., DSM-III, supra § 302.60 (Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood); id. § 302.85 (Atypical Gender Identity Order).
84. See Camille Beredjick, DSM-V to Rename Gender Identity Disorder ‘Gender
Dysphoria,’
THE
ADVOC.
(July
23,
2012,
8:00
PM),
https://www.advocate.com/politics/transgender/2012/07/23/dsm-replaces-genderidentity-disorder-gender-dysphoria.
85. Compare DSM-V, supra note 4, § 302.6, with DSM-III, supra note 83. Brief
of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 17.
86. See DSM-V, supra note 4, § 302.6, at 455.
87. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 4.
88. See id. (“[T]hey are completely comfortable living just the way they are.”).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(1) (2012). The exclusions in § 12211 also prohibit coverage for “transvestites,” although this exclusion is not especially relevant for
transgender individuals. Id. “Transvestite” is a particularly antiquated term and was
typically used to “refer to men who occasionally wear clothes, makeup, and accessories culturally associated with women.” GLAAD Guide, supra note 77. Now more
commonly referred to as “cross-dressing,” “transvestitism” describes a form of gender
expression.
OF

Gender expression [refers to e]xternal manifestations of gender, expressed
through a person’s name, pronouns, clothing, haircut, behavior, voice, and/or
body characteristics. Society identifies these cues as masculine and feminine,
although what is considered masculine or feminine changes over time and varies by culture. Typically, transgender people seek to align their gender expression with their gender identity, rather than the [gender] they were assigned
at birth.
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to self-identify as transsexual.90 The term refers to an individual who has
changed or seeks to change their body through medical intervention.91 Unlike “transgender,” “transsexual” is not an umbrella term, and many
transgender individuals do not identify as transsexual.92

B. Overview of the ADA
Recognizing that individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, Congress enacted the ADA to provide clear and
enforceable standards to address and eradicate such discrimination.93 The
ADA “prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas of public life, including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and
private places that are open to the general public.”94 An individual is considered “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA if they have a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, if they have a
record of such impairment, or if they are regarded as having such impairment.95 In addition to making discrimination on the basis of disability unlawful, the ADA mandates “reasonable accommodations” for individuals with
disabilities in various circumstances and prohibits retaliation for requesting
reasonable accommodations.96 Government agencies, such as the DOJ, regulate and enforce the provisions of the ADA.97
Id. “Transvestites” are typically cisgender – that is, their gender identity matches
their gender assigned at birth. See id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
94. An Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act, ADA NAT’L NETWORK,
https://adata.org/factsheet/ADA-overview (last visited June 25, 2018). For example,
“the ADA prohibits discrimination in all employment practices, including job application procedures, hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment. It applies to recruitment, advertising, tenure, layoff, leave, fringe benefits, and all other employment-related activities.” The
ADA:
Questions
and
Answers,
EEOC,
https://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/publications/adaqa1.cfm?renderforprint=1 (last visited
June 25, 2018).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(a) (2012); see also supra notes 51–62 and accompanying text.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); see also An Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 94.
Reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment to a job or the
work environment that will enable a qualified applicant or employee with a
disability to participate in the application process or to perform essential job
functions. Reasonable accommodation also includes adjustments to assure
that a qualified individual with a disability has rights and privileges in employment equal to those of [employees without disabilities.]
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To establish a prima facie claim of employment discrimination under
the ADA, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [they are] disabled within the meaning of the ADA,98 (2) [they are] a qualified individual under the ADA, 99 and
(3) [they] suffered an adverse employment action because of [their] disability.”100 This burden is different for retaliation claims101 and claims related to
the failure to reasonably accommodate.102

C. Transgender Plaintiffs Have Not Historically Found Redress Under
the ADA
While the ADA has protected the civil rights of many individuals with
disabilities since its enactment, it has not proven useful for transgender individuals seeking recourse under its mandates. Although some federal courts,
including federal courts of appeal, have held that sex discrimination encompasses discrimination based on transgender status,103 transgender plaintiffs
have not generally succeeded in bringing federal discrimination claims under
the ADA.104 This is because § 12211’s GID Exclusion specifically excludes
The ADA: Questions and Answers, supra note 94.
97. An Overview of the Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 94. Title I
(Employment) is regulated and enforced by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission; Title II (Public Services: State and Local Government) and Title III
(Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities) are regulated and
enforced by the DOJ; Title IV (Telecommunications) is regulated by the Federal
Communication Commission. Id.
98. See supra notes 51–62 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
100. EEOC. v. Prod. Fabricators, Inc., 763 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Hill v. Walker, 737 F.3d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 2013)).
101. Id. at 972. “[T]o establish . . . a retaliation claim under the ADA, a ‘plaintiff
must show that (1) [she] engaged in a statutorily protected activity, (2) the employer
took an adverse action against [her], and (3) there was a causal connection between
the adverse action and the protected activity.’” Id. (quoting Hill, 737 F.3d at 1218).
102. Id. at 971.
To show that an employer failed to participate in the interactive process, the
employee must show: “1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability;
2) the employee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; 3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee
in seeking accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been reasonably
accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.”

Id. (quoting Peyton v. Fred’s Store of Ark., Inc., 561 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2009)).
103. See infra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(finding an employer’s requirement that transgender employee use men’s restroom
did not violate the ADA because “transsexualism is excluded from the definition of
disability no matter how it is characterized, whether as a physical impairment, a mental disorder, or some combination thereof”), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004).
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“transsexualism” and “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments.”105 Until Blatt, the few federal courts that considered the issue
generally dismissed ADA claims brought by transgender plaintiffs out-ofhand due to the text of the GID Exclusion.106

D. Intent to Exclude Transgender Individuals from Coverage Under
the ADA
The ADA was the first comprehensive civil rights law concerning individuals with disabilities that prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, employment, public services, and telecommunications.107 The ADA
was a noteworthy victory for disability advocates who for decades lobbied for
such protections, but passage of the ADA required last-minute compromise.108 The legislative record demonstrates that Senator Armstrong, Senator
Hatch, and Senator Helms (who harbored a particularly sharp animus toward
the LGBT community109) feared that certain individuals – those engaged in
illegal activities like drug usage and those deemed to lead “immoral” lifestyles, namely, “homosexuals,” “bisexuals,” and “transvestites” – would be
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012).
106. Id.
107. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 protected only against discrim-

ination on the basis of disability in federal programs and by those programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §
794(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115–185), preempted by Joren v. Napolitano,
633 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 2011). See generally Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No.
93–112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (1982)).
108. Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for
Transgender People, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 11–23 (2013).
Given the unlikely company in which GID (and Transsexualism) finds itself, one might guess that this list was not the result of careful congressional deliberation. And one would be right. This list was a slapdash collection . . . grafted onto the ADA by amendment to ensure passage in the
Senate.
Id. at 11.
109. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01 (statement of Sen. Helms), Cong. Rec.
S10768, at 1989 WL 183216.
If the Senator will forgive me, I know everybody has a different idea about
how to draft a piece of legislation. If this were a bill involving people in a
wheelchair or those who have been injured in the war, that is one thing. But
how in the world did you get to the place that you did not even [ex]clude
transvestites? How did you get into this business of classifying people who are
HIV positive, most of whom are drug addicts or homosexuals or bisexuals, as
disabled?

Id.
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covered under the statute.110 The exclusions found in § 12211 were meant to
quell the Senators’ reservations.111 Some senators knew the exclusions were
questionable,112 but neither they nor the interested disability advocates were
prepared to risk the ADA’s passage in the Senate.113 Alas, the exclusions
were codified.114 For this reason, when transgender plaintiffs face discrimination in public accommodations, employment practices, and elsewhere, they
typically seek legal redress under other statutes (and, when appropriate, constitutional provisions).115
110. See, e.g., id. (“Well, all that is well and good. What I get out of all of this is
here comes the U.S. Government telling the employer that he cannot set up any moral
standards for his business by asking someone if he is HIV positive, even though 85
percent of those people are engaged in activities that most Americans find abhorrent.
That is one of the problems I find with this bill.”); see also Barry, supra note 108, at
14 (alteration in original) (“Echoing Senator Armstrong’s and Rudman’s moral concerns, Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) pressed the sponsors on the ADA’s presumptive
coverage of five groups of individuals: ‘homosexuals’; ‘transvestites’; illegal drug
users and alcoholics; ‘people who are HIV positive or have active AIDS disease’; and
those with ‘psychosis, neurosis, or other mental, psychological disease[s] or disorder[s],’ namely, pedophilia, schizophrenia, kleptomania, manic depression, intellectual disabilities, and psychotic disorders.”).
111. Kevin Berry writes:
GID was excluded from the ADA because, in 1989, a small handful of senators believed that gender nonconformity – like pedophilia, pyromania, and
kleptomania – was morally harmful to the community. In the eleventh hour of
a marathon floor debate, and in the absence of an organized transgender lobby, the ADA’s sponsors and disability rights advocates reluctantly agreed to
sacrifice GID and nine other mental impairments in exchange for passage in
the Senate. The fact that Congress went out of its way to exclude GID, along
with nine mental impairments that involve some harm to oneself or others,
sends a strong symbolic message: people with GID have no civil rights worthy
of respect. The ADA is a moral code, and people with GID its moral castaways.

Barry, supra note 108, at 1.
112. See id. at 14–15 (alternation in original) (quoting 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), Cong. Rec S 10785, at 1989 WL 183216) (“Senator Harkin
assured Senator Helms that, even absent an explicit exclusion, homosexuality and
bisexuality were not covered by the ADA–not for moral reasons, but for medical
ones. ‘[B]ehavior characteristics’ such as ‘homosexuality and bisexuality are not
disabilities under any medical standards.’”).
113. See Barry, supra note 108, at 24–25.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012).
115. For example, transgender plaintiffs often seek redress under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act and its prohibition of sex discrimination. See infra note 128.
Transgender plaintiffs also seek redress under equal protection guarantees of the
United States Constitution. See Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1299 (N.D.
Ga. 2010) (holding transgender employee could bring equal protection claim based on
sex stereotyping), aff’d, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 10

814

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

E. Current Legal Protections for Transgender Individuals
Transgender individuals in the United States do not currently enjoy the
protection of explicit federal civil rights legislation that bars discrimination
on the basis of gender identity.116 While Congress has been slow to pass explicit legislation protecting the rights of transgender individuals, federal
courts and various federal agencies have provided alternate avenues for such
individuals to assert claims of discrimination based on gender identity, including transgender status.
Title VII provides one such avenue. 117 For transgender plaintiffs, the
critical question in litigation has commonly been whether discrimination
based on transgender status constitutes impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII.118 Early appellate decisions held that Title VII’s prohibition on
sex discrimination did not proscribe discrimination on the basis of
transgender status.119 However, the legal landscape for transgender individuals shifted significantly following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.120
Price Waterhouse concerned a female accountant who was nominated
for partnership in her accounting firm.121 When she was denied the partnership, she sued under Title VII, claiming that her firm discriminated against
her on the basis of her sex.122 The plaintiff was told to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair

116. See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

(2012).
117. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended, makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). Title VII specifically prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sex, including the hiring and termination of employees and discrimination “with respect to [an individual’s] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
118. See infra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982)
(“[D]iscrimination based on one’s transsexualism does not fall within the protective
purview of the Act.”); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977). “By the mid-1980s, it was thus settled [law] in the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits that Title VII did not prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
transgender identity.” Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 521 (D.
Conn. 2016) (“[T]hat result was premised in all three Circuits on congressional intent
and a ‘plain reading’ or ‘traditional definition’ of the word ‘sex.’”).
120. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No 102–166, 105 Stat 1071, as recognized in Burrage v. United
States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014).
121. Id. at 231.
122. Id. at 231–32.
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styled, and wear jewelry.”123 The Court deemed these comments “clear
signs” that partners at the plaintiff’s firm were responding adversely to her
because she was a woman and held that the accounting firm had engaged in
impermissible sex discrimination.124
In so holding, the Court recognized that discrimination based on failure
to conform to gender stereotypes is an actionable form of sex discrimination.125 Transgender plaintiffs who have succeeded in federal courts have
often relied on the sex discrimination framework espoused in Price Waterhouse.126
Post-Price Waterhouse, the First, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that discrimination based on transgender status constitutes
impermissible sex discrimination under Title VII or the Equal Protection

123. Id. at 235 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117
(D.D.C. 1985), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d by
490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No 102–166, 105 Stat 1071, as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 571
U.S. 204 (2014)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 251.
126. See e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 737 (6th Cir. 2005)
(holding that trans plaintiff stated a claim for sex discrimination “by alleging discrimination . . . for [their] failure to conform to sex stereotypes”).
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Clause.127 Numerous U.S. District Courts have reached the same conclusion.128
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is the only federal appellate court post-Price Waterhouse to maintain the pre-Price Waterhouse
doctrine on transgender status and Title VII.129 The Tenth Circuit relied on
the “traditional” sex binary to conclude that transgender plaintiffs were not
entitled to Title VII protection “based solely on their status as
[transgender].”130
In 2012, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) ruled that discriminating against someone based on transgender
status constitutes discrimination based on sex, which violates Title VII.131
Discrimination against a person based on transgender status may also contra-

127. See EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574
(6th Cir. 2018) (holding a funeral home’s decision to fire a transitioning, transgender
employee violated Title VII); Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of
Ed., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. May 30, 2017) (holding that discrimination against
transgender students constitutes sex discrimination under Title IX of the Education
Amendments Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution
upon a theory of sexual-stereotyping); Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641
F. App’x 883, 891 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether gender bias motivated the firing of transgender plaintiff, which would
violate Title VII); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming
a transgender employee could bring a an equal protection claim because “discrimination against a transgender individual because of [their] gender nonconformity is sex
discrimination, whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender”), aff’g,
724 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (N.D. Ga. 2010); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729
(6th Cir. 2005) (holding that transgender plaintiff stated a claim for sex discrimination
“by alleging discrimination ... for [their] failure to conform to sex stereotypes”);
Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[D]iscrimination against
a plaintiff who is . . . transgender . . . is no different from the discrimination directed
against Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in sex-stereotypical terms, did not
act like a woman.”); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000);
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining Gender Motivated Violence Act, which parallels the sex discrimination standard of Title VII,
reaches conduct motivated by transgender identity and other gender nonconformity).
128. See, e.g., Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 528 (D.
Conn. 2016) (denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment because discrimination on the basis of transgender identity is cognizable under Title VII as sex discrimination); Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1015–16 (D. Nev.
2016) (granting partial summary judgment for employee by finding employer discriminated against transgender employee on the basis of his gender); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding a revocation of a job offer “because of sex” constituted discrimination in violation of Title VII).
129. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
130. Id. at 1222.
131. Macy v. Dep’t of Justice, Appeal No. 0120120821 (EEOC April 20, 2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/decisions/0120120821%20Macy%20v%20DOJ%20ATF.txt.
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vene the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”).132 Though the FHA does not explicitly
prohibit discrimination based on gender identity, discrimination against a
transgender person based on non-conformity with gender stereotypes may be
covered by the FHA’s prohibition of discrimination based on sex in accordance with Price Waterhouse.133
In 2014, then-Attorney General Eric Holder of the DOJ issued a policy
memo that directed all Department of Justice Correspondents and United
States Attorneys to “take the position in litigation that the protection of Title
VII . . . extends to claims of discrimination based on an individual’s gender
identity, including transgender status.”134 Holder explained, “This will help
to foster fair and consistent treatment for all claimants throughout the government, in furtherance of this Department’s commitment to fair and impartial justice for all Americans.”135 On October 4, 2017, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions issued a memo reversing this policy, stating, “Title VII does not
prohibit discrimination based on gender identity per se.”136
The civil rights of transgender individuals have become an increasingly
salient issue. The public’s and the media’s increased attention on the issue
reflect this saliency, as do the aforementioned stances taken by federal agencies like the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”),
the EEOC, and the DOJ.137 The recent increase in litigation concerning

132. See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).
133. Ending Housing Discrimination Against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and

Transgender Individuals and Their Families, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/LGBT_Housing_Disc
rimination (last visited June 26, 2018). HUD also has an Equal Access Rule. “In
addition, housing providers that receive HUD funding or have loans insured by the
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), as well as lenders insured by FHA, are subject to HUD’s Equal Access Rule, which requires equal access to HUD programs
without regard to a person’s actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, or
marital status.” Id.
134. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Holder Directs Dep’t to Include Gender Identity Under Sex Discrimination Emp’t Claims (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-includegender-identity-under-sex-discrimination. See also Memorandum from the Attorney
General to United States Attorneys Heads of Department Components 2 (Dec. 15,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/file/188671/download.
135. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Holder Directs Dep’t to Include Gender Identity Under Sex Discrimination Emp’t Claims (Dec. 18, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-directs-department-includegender-identity-under-sex-discrimination.
136. Memorandum from the Attorney General to United States Attorneys Heads
of
Department
Components
(Oct.
4,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1006981/download (alteration in original).
137. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 10

818

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

transgender rights in federal courts also reflects the growing saliency of the
issue.138
Since Price Waterhouse, Title VII has been instrumental in securing
employment protections for transgender employees, but not all federal courts
of appeal have held that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination includes
discrimination based on transgender status or gender identity.139 Likewise,
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of equal protection have
been held to protect transgender individuals in employment, education, military service, and other matters, but their reach is limited to the constraint of
the federal and state governments.140 While unquestionably necessary, neither Title VII nor the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment provides comprehensive, nationwide protections for transgender individuals in certain crucial
areas of the law, such as public accommodations. Nor is there an explicit
federal law protecting transgender individuals in public accommodations.141
Instead, a patchwork of state and local laws provide some public accommodations protection for transgender individuals.142

138. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858
F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C.), stay denied by No. 17-1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 6553389 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2017); Evancho v.
Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Carcaño v. McCrory,
203 F. Supp. 3d 615 (M.D.N.C. 2016); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist.
v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Love v. Johnson, 146
F. Supp. 3d 848 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
139. See supra notes 128–29 and accompanying text.
140. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; see also supra note 128.
141. Federal law does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in public
accommodations, however the majority of states – forty-four and the District of Columbia – do. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND
ACCESS
TO
PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS
1
(2014),
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/kyr/PublicAccommodations_Septemb
er2014.pdf.
Many state courts and enforcement agencies have interpreted these laws to
protect transgender people. Many states and localities also explicitly prohibit
discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation in public accommodations. The following 17 states have explicit protections: California,
Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Maine,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington State, as well as the District of Columbia. More than
200 cities and counties also explicitly prohibit gender identity discrimination
even if their state does not.

Id.
142. See id.
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F. States’ Attacks on Transgender Individuals
The issue of transgender rights likely conjures thoughts of so-called
state “bathroom bills” that seek to limit or deny transgender individuals’ ability to use restrooms that correspond with their gender identity.143 These bills
represent only one facet of the fight for transgender rights, but their proliferation in state legislatures in recent years highlights the controversy that still
surrounds those rights. During the 2017 legislative session, sixteen states
considered bathroom bills targeting transgender individuals.144 Moreover, six
states in 2017 “considered legislation that would preempt municipal and
county-level anti-discrimination laws.”145
Proposed and enacted “bathroom bills” have ranged in scope; some
merely prohibit transgender individuals from using restrooms that correspond
to their gender identity, while others make the act a crime punishable by incarceration or a fine.146 For instance, Mark Jennings, a Representative in the
Wyoming House, filed House Bill 244, which proposed that using a public
restroom not corresponding to an individual’s gender assigned at birth constituted an act of public indecency punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment or a $750 fine.147
State legislatures are not the only state authorities that have proposed or
enacted bathroom bills. American universities have also implemented bathroom bills. For example, in a 2015 case, campus police at the University of
Pennsylvania arrested a transgender student because he used the men’s re-

143. See Joellen Kralik, “Bathroom Bill” Legislative Tracking: 2017 State Legislation,
NAT’L
CONF.
OF
ST.
LEGIS.
(July
28,
2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/-bathroom-bill-legislativetracking635951130.aspx.
144. See Kralik, supra note 143. The states are Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri Montana, New York, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming. Id. Human Rights
Campaign tracked legislation in 2016, and of the more than 175 anti-LGBT bills
tracked, forty-four were anti-trans, and twenty-nine of those forty-four specifically
related to bathrooms or locker rooms. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., ANTITRANSGENDER LEGISLATION SPREADS NATIONWIDE, BILLS TARGETING TRANSGENDER
CHILDREN SURGE 2 (Feb. 19, 2016), http://assets2.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/HRCAnti-Trans-Issue-Brief-FINAL-REV2.pdf.
145. Kralik, supra note 143. The six states are Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas. Id.
146. See id.
147. See Arno Rosenfeld, Bill Would Amend Wyoming Civil Rights Law to Regulate Bathroom Use, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Jan 27, 2017), https://trib.com/news/stateand-regional/govt-and-politics/bill-would-amend-wyoming-civil-rights-law-toregulate-bathroom/article_2a60c7b3-37cf-5963-9894-d669b6501b7b.html; see also
H.B.
0244,
2017
Leg.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Wy.
2017),
http://www.wyoleg.gov/2017/Introduced/HB0244.pdf.
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stroom.148 Following his arrest, the transgender student was expelled from
the university.149 The university even filed criminal charges against him with
the District Attorney’s office alleging indecent exposure, criminal trespass,
and disorderly conduct.150
Bathroom bills affect younger students in public primary and secondary
schools as well. Missouri is among the states that have recently undertaken
the passage of bathroom bills that would affect K-12 students. In 2017, Senate Bill 98, sponsored by Representative Ed Emery, proposed that students at
K-12 public schools must use bathrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities
that match their assigned gender at birth.151 The bill provided “accommodations” to transgender students in the form of “single-stall restrooms, access to
unisex restrooms, or controlled use of faculty restrooms, locker rooms, or
shower rooms.”152

G. The Supreme Court Almost Weighs In
In 2017, the United States Supreme Court almost took up the issue of
transgender rights in G.G. ex rel Grimm v. Gloucester School Board.153 Specifically, G.G. concerned a young transgender man (Gavin Grimm) and
whether he had the right to use the restroom at his high school that corresponded with his gender identity.154 The case was brought because Grimm
was prohibited from using the men’s restroom155 after his school board implemented a policy requiring students to use restrooms consistent with their
assigned gender at birth.156 Grimm challenged the policy, alleging discrimination in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.157
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed
Grimm’s Title IX claims.158 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal, giving deference to the Department of
Education’s (“DOE’s”) interpretation of Title IX; in a letter from the DOE’s
Office for Civil Rights (“OCR”), the DOE communicated that, under Title
IX, “school[s] generally must treat transgender students consistent with their
148. Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Commonwealth Sys. of Higher Educ., 97
F. Supp. 3d 657, 663–64 (W.D. Pa. 2015).
149. Id. at 664.
150. Id.
151. S. 98, 99th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017),
http://www.senate.mo.gov/17info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=5709
5306.
152. Id.
153. 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. granted in part, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016), vacated
and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).
154. Id. at 714–15.
155. Id. at 714.
156. Id. at 716.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 717.
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gender identity.”159 The position of the DOE was formalized in guidance
issued jointly by the DOJ and the DOE in 2016.160 The joint guidance prohibited schools receiving federal money from discriminating based on a student’s sex, “including discrimination based on a student’s transgender status.”161 The guidance explicitly directed federal agencies to treat a student’s
gender identity as the student’s sex for purposes of enforcing Title IX.162
The Fourth Circuit’s decision garnered a significant amount of attention
in the media, and far more media attention followed when the United States
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.163 However, on February 22, 2017,
the DOJ and the DOE withdrew their joint guidance regarding treatment of
transgender students.164 In light of the withdrawn guidance, the Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision – a decision that relied on the aforementioned
OCR letter that mirrored the position of the later-adopted joint guidance –

159. Id. at 718; see also CATHERINE E. LHAMON, DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY CLASSES AND
EXTRACURRICULAR
ACTIVITIES
¶
31
(Dec.
1,
2014),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/faqs-title-ix-single-sex-201412.pdf
(recognizing transgender students should be treated consistent with their gender identity for purposes of same-sex classes); Letter from James A. Ferg-Cadima, Acting
Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Policy, Off. for Civ. Rts., to Emily T. Prince, Esq. (Jan. 7,
2015),
http://www.bricker.com/documents/misc/transgender_student_restroom_access_12015.pdf.
160. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., and Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assitant Attorney Gen. for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Colleague (May 13, 2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201605-title-ixtransgender.pdf (asserting schools must “treat the student consistent with
the student’s gender identity”). According to the Department of Education’s website,
that joint guidance was disseminated to “ensure that all students, including
transgender students, can attend school in an environment free from discrimination
based on sex.” Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., U.S. Departments of Education
and Justice Release Joint Guidance to Help Schools Ensure the Civil Rights of
Transgender Students (May 13, 2016), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/usdepartments-education-and-justice-release-joint-guidance-help-schools-ensure-civilrights-transgender-students.
161. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, supra note 160, at 1.
162. Id. at 2.
163. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bathroom Case Puts Transgender Student on
National Stage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/gavin-grimm-transgender-rightsbathroom.html.
164. Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., and T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice,
to
Colleague
(Feb.
22,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/page/file/942021/download.
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and remanded the case.165 While this was a disappointing moment for many
transgender individuals and their advocates, it is almost surely not the last
time the Court will take up the issue of transgender rights, whether in the
context of access to restrooms or otherwise.

IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied Cabela’s
motion to dismiss, holding that Blatt’s condition of Gender Dysphoria was
not excluded from coverage under § 12211 of the ADA.166 Recall that Blatt
alleged she was either covered under the ADA or the ADA’s exclusions violated her right to equal protection.167 Had the court held the ADA excluded
Blatt from coverage, it would have been forced to rule on the constitutionality
of the ADA’s GID Exclusion.168 Citing its obligation under the constitutional-avoidance canon,169 the court rationalized a “fairly possible” construction
of the ADA’s GID Exclusion under which it did not need to address the constitutional issue.170
The court concluded that reading the phrase “gender identity disorders”
narrowly to refer to merely “the state of identifying with a [gender other than
the one assigned at birth]” was a fair interpretation of the GID Exclusion.171
Gender Dysphoria, the court said, “goes beyond” merely identifying with a
gender other than the one assigned at birth and is “characterized by clinically
significant stress and other impairments that may be disabling.”172
In adopting this narrow interpretation of “gender identity disorders,” the
court first looked at the text of § 12211.173 The court noted two distinct categories of exclusion: “non-disabling conditions that concern sexual orientation
or identity,” such as homosexuality and bisexuality, and “disabling conditions
that are associated with harmful or illegal conduct,” such as pyromania and

165. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G. ex rel. Grimm, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017)
(mem.) (“Judgment vacated, and case remanded to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of the guidance document
issued by the Department of Education and Department of Justice on February 22,
2017.”).
166. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4
(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
167. Id. at *2.
168. See id.
169. “[E]ven if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that [the court] will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided.” Id. (citing United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957)).
170. Id. at *2–4.
171. Id. at *4.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id. at *3 n.2.
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kleptomania.174 The court reasoned that if it adopted Cabela’s proffered theory of exclusion, then it would create internal incongruence in the statute, as it
would exclude a disabling condition (Gender Dysphoria) that is not associated with harmful or illegal conduct.175
Under the narrower definition of “gender identity disorders” adopted by
the court, no such internal incongruence would arise because “gender identity
disorders” would belong to the first category of exclusions encompassing
non-disabling conditions that concern “sexual orientation or identity.”176
In support of its conclusion, the court emphasized the legislative history
of § 12211. The court stated that § 12211 revealed Congress’ careful intention to distinguish between excluding certain identities from the scope of the
ADA (homosexuality, for instance) on one hand, and not excluding disabling
conditions that individuals with those identities might have on the other.177
The court further explained that its narrow interpretation comported
with the Third Circuit’s mandate that the ADA be “broadly construed to effectuate its purposes” as “a remedial statute designed to eliminate discrimination against the disabled in all facets of society.”178 The court reasoned that,
under the Third Circuit’s instruction, exceptions “such as those listed in [§]
12211 should be read narrowly to give the statute a broad reach.”179

174. Id. at *3.
175. Id.
176. Id. It should be noted that sexual orientation/identity is different from gender

identity. See GLAAD Guide, supra note 77. Judge Leeson refers to “non-disabling
conditions that concern sexual orientation or identity,” and one presumes “identity” as
used by Judge Leeson in this context refers to sexual identity. See Blatt, 2017 WL
2178123, at *3. Nonetheless, Judge Leeson states that “gender identity disorders”
belongs in the first category of non-disabling conditions just described. Id. Thus, one
can also presume that Judge Leeson intended to refer to a category of exclusion encompassing non-disabling conditions that concern both sexual orientation and gender
identity. See id.
177. Id. For instance, the legislative record demonstrates that legislators agreed
that homosexuality was not to be considered a disability, but a gay person with HIV
would not be excluded from ADA protection because HIV is a disabling condition,
and thus the individual would be entitled to protection on that ground. See 135 CONG.
REC. S10765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), Cong. Rec S 10767, at 1989 WL 183216.
178. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *3 (citing Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa.
Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101
(2012).
179. Id. at *3 (citing Bonkowski v. Oberg Indus., 787 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir.
2015) (“Following traditional canons of statutory interpretation, remedial statutes
should be construed broadly to extend coverage and their exclusions or exceptions
should be construed narrowly.”)). The Code of Federal Regulations, as well as other
courts to address similar issues, likewise dictate that the ADA should be construed
broadly in favor of expansive coverage. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2012)
(“The term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive
coverage, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA.”).
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V. COMMENT
This Part first explores how the instant decision’s legal reasoning aligns
with contemporary medical standards. This Part then addresses the potential
arguments against the decision reached by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. Next, this Part explores the importance
and limitations of the DOJ’s Second Statement of Interest in Blatt and further
argues that it articulates another viable method through which transgender
individuals with Gender Dysphoria could be encompassed by the protections
of the ADA. This Part then discusses the position of amici curiae in Blatt and
argues that it, too, presents a viable method by which Gender Dysphoria
could be encompassed by the protections of the ADA. Finally, this Part addresses the manifold ways the public and legal spheres will change if individuals with Gender Dysphoria are entitled to ADA protection.

A. A Landmark Ruling
For twenty-five years, the ADA’s exclusion of transgender individuals
stood relatively unchallenged.180 The instant case marks the first time that a
federal court has held the ADA does not categorically bar a transgender individual from coverage.181 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision is
significant not only for holding that a transgender plaintiff with Gender Dysphoria can sue under the ADA, but also for the reasoning underlying its decision.
In Blatt, Judge Leeson delivered two important conclusions: (1) that being transgender is not, in itself, a medical condition or disability182 and (2)
that Gender Dysphoria – the stress that can accompany being transgender – is
a medical condition and a covered disability.183 In so concluding, Judge
Leeson drew an important line between identifying with a gender other than
180. Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, A Landmark Victory for Trans Rights – Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, SLATE (May 24, 2017, 12:27 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2017/05/24/a_landmark_victory_for_trans_right
s_under_the_ada.html; but see Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F.Supp.2d 996 (N.D.
Ohio 2003), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing a transgender employee’s sex discrimination claim despite the employee’s argument that her GID resulted
from a physical impairment and therefore should not be barred from coverage under
the GID Exclusion).
181. Barry & Levi, supra note 180.
182. Id. Judge Leeson does not explicitly state that being transgender is not a
disability. See generally Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123. Nonetheless, Judge Leeson
reaches this conclusion. See id. at 4. The opinion articulates the mere state of identifying with a gender other than the gender assigned at birth (i.e., being transgender)
belongs to the non-disabling category of exclusion. Id. at *4. Thus, one assumes that
in placing transgender status in the non-disabling category, it is not considered a disability. See id.
183. Barry & Levi, supra note 180.
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the one assigned at birth and the clinically significant stress that can accompany one’s gender identity.184
Judge Leeson’s decision was praised by advocates for this distinction,
which aligns with contemporary medical standards.185 The DSM-V has shifted away from labeling or implying that transgender people are mentally ill.186
“Gender Dysphoria” replaced the term “Gender Identity Disorder” in the
DSM-V to facilitate an understanding that being transgender is not, in itself, a
mental condition.187 In contrast, the clinically significant stress that can result
from being transgender is a medical condition.188 When the change was implemented in 2013, the APA wrote, “DSM-[V] aims to avoid stigma and ensure clinical care for individuals who see and feel themselves to be a different
gender than their assigned gender. . . . It is important to note that gender
nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder.”189 Thus, Judge Leeson’s
opinion reflects the prevailing views of one of the nation’s foremost authorities on mental health and mental conditions – the APA190 – and his decision
has been acknowledged for its conformity with these prevailing medical
views.191
However, because not all transgender people have Gender Dysphoria,
Blatt may not benefit the entire transgender community. Absent a showing
that a transgender individual was discriminated against because they were
regarded as having Gender Dysphoria, a plaintiff that does not experience
Gender Dysphoria would not be protected by the ADA.192 In this way, Blatt
may appear to be a peculiar decision. It may strike one as perplexing to imagine that an employer could discriminate against two transgender employees
in precisely the same way, but only the employee that does or is thought to
experience Gender Dysphoria would be protected under the statute. Application of Blatt may therefore be complicated given that many transgender people do not, in fact, experience Gender Dysphoria.193 Thus, Blatt does not
184.
185.
186.
187.

Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4.
Id.
See supra Section III.A.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, GENDER DYSPHORIA 1 (2013),
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSMV-Gender-Dysphoria.pdf.
188. Id.
189. Id. (emphasis added).
190. “APA is a national medical specialty society whose more than 37,000 physician members specialize in the diagnosis, treatment, prevention and research of mental illnesses, including substance use disorders.” Id. at 2.
191. See Barry & Levi, supra note 180.
192. See supra note 51.
193. As explored in Section III.A of this Note, transgender is an umbrella term
and there are various gender identities that fall under this umbrella. One might think
of transgender men or women, but the gender identity spectrum extends far beyond
this limited, binary conception. See GLAAD Guide supra note 77. Many individuals
in the umbrella do not experience Gender Dysphoria. See Brief of Amici Curiae,
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render the GID Exclusion obsolete; an adoption of Blatt nationwide would
mean the exclusion simply denies ADA protection to a distinct section of the
transgender community – those who do not and are not assumed to suffer
from Gender Dysphoria.
However, this result comports with the purpose of the ADA – to provide
legal protections for individuals with disabling conditions.194 Without the
presence of a disabling condition like Gender Dysphoria (or a discriminatory
action under the presumption of Gender Dysphoria195), invocation of the
ADA would be improper, as the relief sought would be beyond the ADA’s
scope and purpose.
Blatt begs practical questions as well. Presumably, transgender plaintiffs with Gender Dysphoria need to prove their disability in some way – but
how? Must they have an official diagnosis? Not everyone can afford medical care, including the ability to be officially diagnosed by a medical or mental health professional. Moreover, the necessity of an official diagnosis may
present problems for transgender individuals who live in areas in which medical or mental health providers refuse to provide them service precisely because they are transgender and have Gender Dysphoria.196 Thus, if one is
unable to travel to a non-discriminatory doctor or psychiatrist,197 the very
reason an individual is entitled to protection under the ADA may be the reason they are unable to prove that entitlement. No such evidentiary issue was
presented in Blatt because Blatt had an official diagnosis, but that may not
always be the case. Future courts may have to grapple with these kinds of
questions.

supra note 9, at 3–4. Individuals who are non-binary, gender-fluid, genderqueer, or
agender may not experience Gender Dysphoria. Though empirical studies have not
attempted to understand a correlation between particular gender identities and the
experience of Gender Dysphoria, it is possible that one subset of the transgender population experiences Gender Dysphoria less regularly than another.
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012).
195. A person treated adversely based on Gender Dysphoria, whether real or perceived, would be covered under the ADA’s regarded-as prong, as amended. See 42
U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (2012).
196. Shabab Ahmed Mirza & Caitlin Rooney, Discrimination Prevents LGBTQ
People from Accessing Health Care, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Jan. 18, 2018,
9:00 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2018/01/18/445130/discriminatio
n-prevents-lgbtq-people-accessing-health-care/. The Center for American Progress
stated that twenty-nine percent of transgender respondents reported that a doctor or
health care provider had refused them an appointment because they were transgender.
Id.
197. Twenty-nine percent of transgender respondents had to travel more than
twenty-five miles or more to access transition-related care. Id.
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B. Arguments Against Judge Leeson’s Interpretation of the GID Exclusion
One argument against Judge Leeson’s interpretation of the GID Exclusion is that the legislature intended to exclude transgender people from ADA
protection. However, this argument ultimately provides little cause to reject
the reasoning in Blatt. The legislative record makes clear that lawmakers
intended to ensure that LGBT people were not considered disabled because
they are LGBT.198 However, those same lawmakers discussed that LGBT
status should not preclude coverage for LGBT people who also happen to
have disabling conditions.199 Blatt does not stray from this intent – Blatt is
covered not because she is transgender, but because she has a disabling condition.200
One could also quibble that Gender Dysphoria is not disabling; however, the text of the ADA and medical literature, including the definition of
Gender Dysphoria in the DSM-V, support Judge Leeson’s finding that Gender Dysphoria is, in fact, disabling.201 To be diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria, an individual must have “clinically significant []stress or impairment in
occupational, social, or other important areas of functioning” that is present
for at least six months.202 By definition under the ADA, significant social
and occupational impairment constitutes a disability.203
Another argument against Judge Leeson’s interpretation of the GID Exclusion is that “gender identity disorders not resulting from impairment”
should be interpreted to include Gender Dysphoria. This argument is not
especially strong. Recall that Judge Leeson defined “gender identity disorders” as merely the state of identifying with a gender other than the one assigned at birth, and thus held the phrase did not include a condition like Gender Dysphoria.204
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Leeson took a classic interpretive approach and construed the statute so as to render it internally consistent.205 As
198. See 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), Cong. Rec S
10767, at 1989 WL 183216; see also Barry, supra note 108, at 24–25.
199. See 135 CONG. REC. S10765-01, Cong. Rec S 10767, at 1989 WL 183216.
“Congress was careful to distinguish between excluding certain sexual identities from
the ADA’s definition of disability, on one hand, and not excluding disabling conditions that persons of those identities might have, on the other hand.” Blatt v. Cabela’s
Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
200. Id. at *4.
201. See DSM-V, supra note 4, § 302.6, at 455.
202. Id. at 451–53.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012). “Concentrating, thinking, communicating
and working” are all listed as major life activities, the substantial impairment of
which renders the condition from which they are caused to be a disability under the
ADA. Id.
204. Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4.
205. Id. at *3.
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Judge Leeson recognized, the statute creates two categories of exceptions.206
The first deals with “non-disabling conditions that concern sexual orientation
or gender identity,” and the second concerns disabling conditions that are
“associated with harmful or illegal conduct.”207 Judge Leeson rightly determined that to exclude Gender Dysphoria “would exclude from the ADA conditions that are actually disabling but that are not associated with harmful or
illegal conduct.”208 Therefore, including Gender Dysphoria in the definition
of “gender identity disorders” would create an anomalous result. Consequently, an argument that the GID Exclusion should encompass Gender Dysphoria lacks convincing support.209

C. The DOJ Says Gender Dysphoria is Covered Under the ADA
The DOJ took an official position in its Second Statement of Interest
that ultimately aligned with Judge Leeson’s holding that Gender Dysphoria is
a disabling condition covered under the ADA.210 However, unlike Judge
Leeson’s decision, the DOJ’s position was not based on a narrow interpretation of the ADA’s exclusion, and it provides another rationale that supports
the conclusion that Gender Dysphoria is a protected disability under the
ADA.
The ADA excludes “gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairment.”211 In its Second Statement of Interest, the DOJ recognized
the contemporary medical view that suggests Gender Dysphoria has roots in
biology and physiology.212 In relevant part, the Second Statement of Interest
reads: “[U]nder a reasonable interpretation of the statute, Plaintiff’s [G]ender
[D]ysphoria falls outside of the scope of the GID Exclusion because a growing body of scientific evidence suggests that it may ‘result[] from [a] physical
impairment[].’”213 Quoting the amici curiae in the case, the DOJ endorsed
the view that “burgeoning medical research underlying [Gender Dysphoria]
points to a physical etiology.”214
Physiological and biological roots arguably fall under the “physical impairment” caveat of the GID Exclusion. The ADA itself does not define the
phrase “not resulting from physical impairment.”215 However, the ADA is
construed to provide at least as much protection as the regulations implement206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Second Statement of Interest, supra note 72, at 5–6.
42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
Second Statement of Interest, supra note 72, at 3.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at

15).
215. Id. at 2.
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ing the Rehabilitation Act,216 which define “physical impairment” to mean
“‘[a]ny physiological disorder or condition’ affecting various body systems
including ‘neurological,’ ‘reproductive,’ or ‘genitourinary.’”217 Further, the
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act explain that “physical impairment” was designed to include “any condition which is . . . physical but
whose precise nature is not at present known.”218 Thus, the DOJ argued, the
term “physical impairment,” if properly construed, leaves room for scientific
developments.219 Given the burgeoning science, “the remedial nature of the
ADA” and the broad reading of “physical impairment,” the DOJ asserted
“that [G]ender [D]ysphoria falls outside [the GID Exclusion’s] scope” and
therefore “[s]hould not be excluded from the ADA's definition of ‘disability.’”220
This official stance taken by the DOJ is profound. It perhaps marks the
first time that the federal government has recognized and urged in an official
capacity that Gender Dysphoria has roots in physiology. The DOJ’s Second
Statement of Interest is important in another respect – given the DOJ’s prestige and authority, it may increase the likelihood that future courts hearing
ADA complaints from transgender individuals adopt Judge Leeson’s view
that Gender Dysphoria is not excluded from ADA protection.
Even if courts reject Judge Leeson’s narrow interpretation of the term
“gender identity disorders,” adoption of the DOJ’s position would take Gender Dysphoria out of the purview of the ADA’s exclusion of “gender identity
disorders not resulting from physical impairment.”221 If Gender Dysphoria is
said to be a “gender identity disorder” but is recognized by courts as having
roots in physiology (i.e., resulting from physical impairment), then the exclusion would not apply.222
In reply to the DOJ’s Second Statement of Interest, a statement was filed
by a prominent group of LGBT advocacy organizations serving as amici curiae in the case.223 In this statement, the amici agreed that Gender Dysphoria is
not excluded by the GID Exclusion.224 However, the amici asserted, as they
did in a previously filed brief,225 that this is because Gender Dysphoria is not
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 3 (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1998)).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2012)).
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 C.F.R. §§ 84.62–84.99 (1977)).
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
See id.
Statement of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Mazzoni
Center, National Center for Lesbian Rights, National Center for Transgender Equality, National LQBTQ Task Force, and Transgender Law Center in Response to Second
Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc.,
No. 5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2015), 2015 WL 9907588 [hereinafter Statement of Amici Curiae in Response].
224. Id. at. 1.
225. See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 13.
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a “gender identity disorder” at all; instead, it is a separate, “new and different
diagnosis that does not fall within the letter or spirit of the GID Exclusion.”226 Amici noted that the GID Exclusion prohibits coverage for certain
“gender identity disorders” but says nothing of Gender Dysphoria.227 As of
the DSM’s revision in 2013, the amici argued, Gender Identity Disorder and
“gender identity disorders” no longer exist; “there is only Gender Dysphoria.”228
Amici supported this argument by detailing that when Gender Dysphoria replaced GID in the DSM-V, the APA did more than rename the diagnosis
– “it revised the diagnostic criteria underlying the diagnosis, it re-categorized
the diagnosis within the DSM, and it referenced new science supporting the
physiological etiology of the diagnosis.”229 Therefore, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the amici made a strong argument that Gender Dysphoria
does not fall under any definition of “gender identity disorder” and is completely outside the purview of the GID Exclusion.230 The amici opined that
the DOJ ignored “significant differences” between GID and Gender Dysphoria but nonetheless agreed with the “thrust of the United States’ position” that
Gender Dysphoria “falls outside the scope of the GID Exclusion.”231
Whatever reasoning one might find most persuasive, the ultimate conclusion drawn by Judge Leeson, the DOJ, and amici curiae is the same: Gender Dysphoria is a protected disability under the ADA.

D. A New Legal Landscape Under Blatt
Blatt is a profound decision with vast implications. For those with Gender Dysphoria, a new world will emerge if Judge Leeson’s interpretation of
the ADA232 prevails in other courts around the country – a world marked by
an exponential increase in legal protections. Transgender individuals with
Gender Dysphoria who face discrimination in myriad facets of life would
finally have a means to access the protection Congress and many states refuse
to enact through targeted legislation.
If courts interpret the ADA to include protection for transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria, public accommodations nationwide would no
longer have carte blanche to deny transgender individuals service or the right
to use restrooms consistent with their gender identity.233 This would be par226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Statement of Amici Curiae in Response, supra note 223, at 2.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2012).
Statement of Amici Curiae in Response, supra note 223, at 2 n.1.
See Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 9, at 15.
See id. at 20–24.
Statement of Amici Curiae in Response, supra note 223, at 2–3.
Implications are equally vast under the DOJ and amici’s reasoning, each
concluding that Gender Dysphoria falls outside the purview of the GID Exclusion.
See supra Section IV.C.
233. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012) (“No individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, ser-
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ticularly groundbreaking because private entities such as hotels, movie theaters, restaurants, stadiums, grocery stores, shopping centers, banks, pharmacies, lawyers’ and doctors’ offices, hospitals, and more are considered public
accommodations so long as their “operations . . . affect commerce.”234 Given
the far-reaching protections of the ADA, adopting Blatt nationwide would
have a powerful effect on the daily lives of transgender individuals.
Moreover, a nationwide adoption of Blatt would likely have a profound
effect on young transgender individuals attending primary, secondary, and
post-secondary school who are threatened with discrimination.235 In recent
years, an increasing number of lawsuits have been filed that challenge school
board prohibitions regarding the use of restrooms that match a student’s gen-

vices, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
public accommodation.”).
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2012). Under the ADA, all of
[t]he following private entities are considered public accommodations . . . if
the operations of such entities affect commerce[:] (A) an inn, hotel, motel, or
other place of lodging, except for an establishment located within a building
that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the residence of such proprietor; (B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; (C) a
motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment; (D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or
other place of public gathering; (E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store,
hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment; (F) a
laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment; (G) a terminal, depot, or other station
used for specified public transportation; (H) a museum, library, gallery, or
other place of public display or collection; (I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or
other place of recreation; (J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate,
or postgraduate private school, or other place of education; (K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or
other social service center establishment; (L) and a gymnasium, health spa,
bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.

Id. “The term ‘commerce’ means travel, trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication – (A) among the several States; (B) between any foreign country or
any territory or possession and any State; or (C) between points in the same State but
through another State or foreign country.” Id. § 12181(1).
235. See, e.g., Moriah Balingit, Gavin Grimm Just Wanted to Use the Bathroom.
He Didn’t Think the Nation Would Debate It., WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/gavin-grimm-just-wanted-to-usethe-bathroom-he-didnt-think-the-nation-would-debate-it/2016/08/30/23fc9892-6a2611e6-ba32-5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html?utm_term=.f593a4f8f371.
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der identity.236 Under Blatt, a university, high school, elementary, or other
school policy categorically prohibiting transgender students from using restrooms that match their gender identity would not be permissible. Indeed,
under Blatt, even private universities not receiving federal funds would be
prohibited from implementing “bathroom bills” or policies that target
transgender individuals so long as such entities properly fit within the description of a “public accommodation.”237 Moreover, if a nationwide consensus aligned with Blatt takes hold, “bathroom bills” could not be enacted by
state legislatures.

E. Eliminating Discrimination in Employment
The ADA applies to certain private employers with more than fifteen
employees, state and local governments, employment agencies, labor unions,
agents of an employer and joint management labor committees.238 The ADA
prohibits discrimination in a wide variety of employment practices, including
hiring, firing, advancement, compensation, training, and more.239 Currently,
there are states in which laws do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of
gender identity.240 In those states, individuals can be fired simply for being
transgender. If no binding, favorable federal court precedent exists in the
jurisdiction upon which a transgender person could rely, no legal recourse for
a termination or other adverse action would be available. The logic and holding of the instant case would change such a result.
As Blatt suggests, transgender individuals are often fired because they
are transgender.241 It is not difficult to imagine that prejudice against
transgender individuals likely also biases employers against giving promotions to transgender employees, even when their job performance is stellar.242
It likely happens to transgender individuals across the country. ADA protection for transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria would be a crucial
236. See, e.g., Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267 (W.D.
Pa. 2017); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208
F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2)–(5) (2012).
239. Id. § 12112(a) (2012).
240. See MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, STATE EMPLOYMENT NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS (June. 21, 2018), http://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citationsnondisc-employment.pdf. States without legislation prohibiting discrimination
against transgender employees include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id.
241. See, e.g., EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560
(6th Cir. 2018).
242. See First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 13, ¶ 25.
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step toward ensuring equal employment opportunity for all transgender workers.

F. Healthcare and Incarceration
For transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria, access to healthcare
can be critical to mental and physical health. A nationwide adoption of Blatt
would be profound for transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria in the
healthcare context because it would prohibit any “pharmacy, insurance office,
professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment” from discriminating against a transgender individual with Gender
Dysphoria.243
This means that a pharmacy could not refuse to provide hormones, a
doctor/hospital could not refuse to provide medical care, and an insurance
office could not refuse to provide service to a transgender individual with
Gender Dysphoria based on their condition.244 Protections of this sort are
imperative for transgender individuals with Gender Dysphoria and may be
particularly vital in areas with few providers or in areas where religious-based
refusal of care is common.
Blatt would also be transformative for transgender people who are incarcerated. Often, prisons and jails refuse to house transgender individuals
according to their gender identity.245 This practice can subject transgender
people to physical and sexual violence as well as harassment.246 In June
2018, a federal court in Doe v. Massachusetts declined to dismiss the lawsuit
of a transgender woman being housed in a men’s prison based on the GID
Exclusion, ruling instead that the woman could proceed with her ADA
claim.247 The judge found that Doe “adequately stated a claim under the
ADA” and “adequately pled that she ha[d] been denied the reasonable ac243. These entities, even if private, are considered places of public accommodation under the ADA, provided they affect commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F)
(2012).
244. A proliferation of Blatt nationwide would be especially important if so-called
“religious freedom” bills are enacted at the state level, giving healthcare providers the
legal authorization to refuse to provide care to someone in any instance in which their
gender identity/expression offends a provider’s personal feelings about morality
and/or religion.
245. See Megan McLemore, US Bureau of Prisons Policy Change Endangers
Transgender
Prisoners,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(May
14,
2018),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/14/us-bureau-prisons-policy-change-endangerstransgender-prisoners.
246. More than one in three transgender women have been sexually victimized
according to Prison Rape Elimination Act data. Id. In a national survey, transgender
prisoners reported “physical and sexual assault rates six to [ten] times higher than
non-transgender prisoners.” Id. See also ALLEN J. BECK, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN
PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES 2011-12, (2013).
247. No. CV 17-12255-RGS, 2018 WL 2994403, at *8 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018).
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commodation of a transfer to a woman’s prison.”248 Doe demonstrates the
significance of rulings in line with Blatt and illustrates the meaningful and
potentially life-saving effects of recognizing Gender Dysphoria as a disability
entitled to ADA protection.

VI. CONCLUSION
The ADA is a fundamental piece of civil rights legislation. Its scope is
vast, guaranteeing equal opportunity for individuals with disabilities in public
accommodations, employment, transportation, state and local government
services, and telecommunications.249 While the prohibition on sex discrimination found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and elsewhere encompasses
transgender individuals in many jurisdictions, the current patchwork of protections is inadequate for protecting the rights of all transgender individuals
in the United States. Without explicit federal legislation that provides protections on the basis of gender identity and transgender status, one can expect
that transgender individuals will continue to face discrimination by states,
businesses, and individuals alike. For this reason, existing federal legislation
like the ADA that can be properly construed to protect transgender individuals may play an important role in the developing legal landscape.
Though the ADA codified harmful and unnecessary prejudice against
transgender individuals in the GID Exclusion, the instant decision by the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania marks what could be the first rumbling of a
seismic legal shift. If other courts follow the decision of Judge Leeson,
transgender individuals may soon find that they are indeed afforded the
sweeping protections of the ADA.

248. Id.
249. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–

12213 (1990) (amended 2008).
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